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Passive Money, Active Money,
and Monetary Policy
• The role of money in the transmission of
monetary policy is still controversial. Some
regard it as reacting passively to changes in
prices, output, and interest rates; others see it
playing an active role in bringing about
changes in these variables.
• Empirical evidence favours an active
interpretation of money’s role in the Canadian
economy, particularly in the case of narrow,
transactions-oriented aggregates.
• Institutional changes can, and do, create
instabilities in the demand functions for
narrow aggregates, which undermine their
usefulness as formal policy targets.
• There is, nevertheless, a strong case for the
Bank of Canada to pay more attention to
narrow monetary aggregatesthan it hasin the
1980s and 1990s.
or eight years, an inﬂation target, jointly set by
the Bank of Canada and the federal govern-
ment, has provided the anchor for Canada’s
monetary policy. For a period 20 times as long,
the Quantity Theory of Money has provided econo-
mists with a framework for analyzing the inﬂuence
of the supply of money on the inﬂation rate. The Bank
of Canada regularly comments on the behaviour of
the narrow M1 and the broader M2 aggregates in its
Monetary Policy Report and in the Bank of Canada
Review, but the Quarterly Projection Model (QPM),
which currently provides the analytic background
against which the Bank’s policies are designed,
includes no monetary aggregate.1 Even so, there is a
strong case to be made that the money supply is not
only the key long-run determinant of inﬂation in the
Canadian economy but is also an important variable
in the transmission mechanism through which policy
actions affect the price level, and, in the shorter run,
income and employment as well.
This article ﬁrst discusses the view that money is a
passive variable, which adapts to, but has no causa-
tive signiﬁcance for, the behaviour of prices and out-
put. It then argues that money is better regarded as
playing an active role in the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy. It concludes that there is, there-
fore, a case for according monetary aggregates a more
formal role in the Bank of Canada’s policy framework
than they now hold.2
1.   For an account of QPM’s basic structure, see Poloz, Rose, and Tetlow
(1994). For the interaction between its structure and the Bank’s policy-
formation process, see Duguay and Longworth (1998, Part 5).
2.  The terms active and passive should not be confused with exogenous and
endogenous. Their meaning is discussed in detail below. These terms seem to
have originated within the Bank of Canada, but I have not been able to track
down their first appearance. See Engert and Selody (1998) for a recent example.
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Passive Money, Active Money, and
the Transmission Mechanism
Like the Quantity Theory of Money, the view of
money as a passively endogenous variable has a long
history, but its most recent origins are in a simple vari-
ation on the once-standard IS–LM macroeconomic
model.3 That model traditionally treated the quantity
of money as an exogenous variable, with the rate of
interest determined within the system along with real
income and, in more elaborate versions, the price
level. However, when it came to applying the model
to the actual conduct of monetary policy by real-world
central banks that used an interest rate as their policy
instrument, it seemed more “realistic” to reverse this
arrangement. Thus, the interest rate is exogenous, and
the supply of money adjusts passively to demand, as
determined by the rate of interest, real income, and
the price level.
This passive-money view can be supplemented by a
well-worked-out story about the links between a
change in the interest rate and its ultimate effects on
output, employment, and the quantity of money:
When the monetary authorities lower (raise) the rate
of interest, the demand for money increases
(decreases), and the money supply must begin to rise
(fall) in order to keep the interest rate in place. In an
open economy, the currency is also likely to depreciate
(appreciate) relative to whatever path it is initially fol-
lowing. Only subsequently do ﬁrst output and then
prices begin to respond to the interest rate and the
exchange rate, inducing further changes in the
demand for, and therefore the supply of, money.4
The foregoing story is, however, incomplete. This may
be seen most easily by abstracting from open-econ-
omy complications that do not change any fundamen-
3.  The ﬁrst geometric exposition of IS–LM was done by Hicks (1937). He dis-
cussed both the exogenous money/endogenous interest rate and the exoge-
nousinterestrate/passivelyendogenousmoneyversions.Thepassive-money
view is closely related to the analysis of nineteenth century British anti-bul-
lionists and exponents of the Banking School position, as readers of Jacob
Viner (1937) or Lloyd Mints (1945) will recognize.
4.  This view underlay the Bank of Canada’s implementation of money-
growth targeting in the late 1970s. The narrow M1 aggregate was given a
strategic role partly because its demand seemed to be linked to an interest
rate variable by a relatively large and well-determined coefﬁcient, thus facili-
tating control of its growth with an interest rate instrument. A contemporary
symposium on the program is Courchene, Fortin, Sparks, and White (1979).
The Bank of Canada’s control technique was chosen by careful analysis of
the characteristics of alternative procedures, carried out in the context of an
explicit IS–LM model. See Freedman (1981). For a contemporary account of the
difﬁculties the Bank encountered with money-growth targeting, see Thiessen
(1983), and for a retrospective account, see Duguay and Longworth (1998, Part 2).
tals, and by considering the theoretically limiting case
in which the interest sensitivity of the demand for
money disappears. In this case, it has sometimes been
argued that, since control of the money supply works
through that very interest sensitivity of demand, it is
impossible for the authorities to increase the quantity
of money in circulation by lowering the interest rate
and, hence, impossible for them to set the transmis-
sion mechanism in motion.5 Implicit here, however, is
the implausible assumption that the sole reason mem-
bers of the non-bank public transact with the banking
system is to vary their money holdings. In fact,
regardless of effects on the demand for money, when
the interest rate is cut, the willingness of households
to borrow to ﬁnance, say, purchases of durable goods
grows, as does that of ﬁrms to ﬁnance, say, an increase
in inventories. These are the effects, not of changes in
their demand for money, but in their supply of indebt-
edness to the banking system.
It may seem an odd idea that any
agent, let alone the non-bank public
as a whole, can be “off” its demand-
for-money function.
When an increase in this supply is met by an increase
in the volume of loans made by the banks, however,
the supply of bank liabilities also increases as a matter
of accounting necessity. And in a simple world in
which all bank liabilities are money, so does the sup-
ply of money, even though there has been no increase
in demand.6 This happens even though the non-bank
public’s transactions with the banking system are vol-
untary. Its members accept newly created money from
the banks in exchange for evidence of their indebted-
ness because they wish to use the money to purchase
5.  This argument is not the straw man it might appear to be at ﬁrst sight,
since a number of well-known economists have advanced it. It seems to origi-
nate in Keynes’s (1936, 197) General Theory. It has also appeared in the works
of Gramley and Chase (1965), Hahn (1971), and Hicks (1982, 262–4), among
others.
6.  The passive-money view, built upon IS–LM, ignores the market for bank
credit, as Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer argued from the 1960s onwards.
See Brunner and Meltzer (1993) for a retrospective account of their analysis
and for references to the earlier sources in which they ﬁrst set it out.17 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 1999
goods, services, or other assets—not because they
wish to add it to their cash balances.
Now it may seem an odd idea that any agent, let alone
the non-bank public as a whole, can be “off” its
demand-for-money function. However, the quantity
of money that any agent “demands” is not a ﬁxed sum
to be held at each and every moment, but rather the
target value of an inventory—sometimes termed a
buffer stock—the actual value of which will ﬂuctuate
around that target as the agent’s streams of income
and expenditure are subjected to various shocks, both
under and beyond that agent’s control, both foreseen
and unforeseen. Hence, there is nothing odd about an
agent being off his or her demand-for-money func-
tion, even as a consequence of engaging in voluntary
exchange.7 Furthermore, any economy-wide shock
that affects all agents in the same direction will also
have observable consequences at the level of the econ-
omy as a whole.  An increase (or decrease) in the
aggregate money supply, not initially matched by a
change in agents’ target money holdings, is just such a
shock.  Money put into (or taken out of) circulation
has to go (or come from) somewhere, whether or not
agents want to hold it (or relinquish it), and such an
increase (or decrease) will initially show up as an
increase (or decrease) in the sum of individual agents’
money holdings over and above (or under and below)
their desired levels.
Even so, a “transitory” shock to the money supply,
which pushes the economy off its demand function
only temporarily, is unlikely to have any conse-
quences, because it will be, and will be expected to be,
quickly reversed. A “permanent” shock is a different
matter.8 Once agents perceive that a shock is perma-
nent, they will face the prospect of holding stocks of
real money balances whose implicit service yield is
lower on the margin than that available on other
assets. They will therefore try to reduce the size of
those stocks. What transpires next will depend,
7. Indeed, the widely taught Baumol (1952)–Tobin (1956) inventory-theoretic
model of the demand for money embodies just such effects. In S–s inventory-
theoretic models (e.g., Miller and Orr 1963), the demand for money emerges
as a range between upper and lower limits, rather than as a speciﬁc amount.
To the best of my knowledge, the ﬁrst use of the term buffer stock in the sense
employed here was by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) in their article “Money
and Business Cycles.”
8.  From the 1970s onwards, Brunner and Meltzer argued that confusion
between permanent and transitory shocks was far more important than that
between economy-wide and localized shocks in ensuring that monetary dis-
turbances have signiﬁcant real effects. See Brunner and Meltzer (1993).
among other things, upon the nature of the monetary
system.
It is helpful to consider, as a ﬁrst step (but only as a
ﬁrst step), the theoretically special case where the
nominal money supply is an exogenous variable that
enters the system, not through bank lending at all but
“as if” it had been dropped from a passing helicopter,
to invoke Milton Friedman’s (1969) simile. Here, it is
obvious that individual agents who wish to reduce
money holdings towards a target level can do so only
by transacting with other agents. It is equally obvious
that such transactions, in and of themselves, do noth-
ing to eliminate excess money holdings at the level of
the economy as a whole. Hence, these transactions
will continue until rates of return on other assets,
including consumer and producer durables, have
been bid down, and/or output and/or the price level
have been bid up, to whatever extent is necessary to
bring the economy’s demand for money into equilib-
rium with the new, higher money supply.9  In short,
exogenous money plays an active role in the transmis-
sion mechanism.
The quantity of money is an
endogenous variable, but it
nevertheless plays an active role in
the transmission mechanism.
Similar effects occur in an economy where the ﬁnan-
cial system consists of a central bank and commercial
banks, all of whose liabilities (except for those held by
commercial banks themselves) circulate as money.
Here, an interest rate cut engineered by the central
bank, which initially leads to a permanent increase in
the non-bank public’s demand for nominal bank
credit, also produces a permanent change in the bank-
ing system’s supply of nominal monetary liabilities.
9.  A distinction is sometimes made between one transmission mechanism,
associated with the passive-money view, that works through interest rates,
and another, associated with the active-money view, that relies on the direct
effects of excess money holdings on expenditure. As should be apparent from
the text, this distinction has no theoretical basis. It would be more accurate to
say that the the active-money view pays more attention than does the pas-
sive-money view to the role played in the transmission mechanism by unob-
servable implicit own rates of return on such items as money balances and
consumer and producer durable goods.18 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 1999
As in the helicopter-money case, some argument or
arguments in the economy’s demand-for-money func-
tion have to adjust to restore equilibrium between the
supply and demand for money. The monetary policy
transmission mechanism thus involves not just the
ﬁrst-round direct effects of a lower interest rate on
aggregate demand, but also the subsequent effects of
an accompanying excess money supply on expendi-
ture ﬂows. In this case, the quantity of money is an
endogenous variable, but it nevertheless plays an
active role in the transmission mechanism.
Now, a policy-induced cut in interest rates is not the
only shock that can set in motion a series of events
such as have just been described. Fiscal expansion
ﬁnanced by money creation can do so, as can a distur-
bance on the demand side of the market for bank
credit. A positive shock to productivity, for example,
or to consumer or business conﬁdence, can increase
the proclivity of private agents to borrow from the
banks. Monetary expansion will occur in response to
any disturbance to the margin between the non-bank
public’s supply of indebtedness to the banking system
and its demand for stocks of durable goods and other
assets, not just to a monetary policy action taken by
the central bank.
Matters are more complicated when a signiﬁcant frac-
tion of the banking system’s liabilities are instruments
that are not themselves means of exchange. This is
precisely the case directly relevant to the conduct of
monetary policy in the Canadian, and indeed in any
other advanced, economy. Here, one must distinguish
between narrow and broad money and note that an
agent with excess narrow-money holdings has the
option of purchasing some less-liquid ﬁnancial asset
issued by the banking system. Such a transaction
reduces not only that individual agent’s narrow-
money holdings, but the overall quantity of narrow
money in circulation as well, without the need for any
simultaneous adjustment in the size of the banking
system’s balance sheet. In this case, a shock that leads
to a permanent increase in the supply of bank credit
might produce only a transitory increase in the quan-
tity of narrow money.  If so, then, assuming that its
demand function is empirically stable, narrow money
will still be a useful indicator of the stance of mone-
tary policy, but it will have no causative signiﬁcance,
and the passive-money view will provide an excellent
approximation to reality.
Though this is what could happen, it need not hap-
pen. The actual outcome will depend on the behav-
iour of the agents who receive newly created means of
exchange from those who borrow from the banks and
spend the proceeds, and it seems impossible to gener-
alize here. A ﬁrm selling consumer durables, whose
inventories and degree of bank indebtedness are both
initially too high for comfort, will presumably devote
an inﬂow of cash resulting from the sale of some item
out of inventory to reducing that indebtedness.
Newly created money will, in this case, quickly disap-
pear from circulation.  If that ﬁrm initially has equilib-
rium levels of inventories and indebtedness, the cash
inﬂow might instead be spent on replacing the item
sold and would remain in circulation for a little
longer, depending upon the actions of those further
along the transactions chain. Or again, if the ﬁrm is
willing to tolerate a lower inventory for awhile, but
feels comfortable with its level of bank debt, its newly
acquired cash might be parked in some form of notice
deposit, pending a later decision. This would reduce
some narrow measures of the economy’s money sup-
ply but, perhaps, not the broader ones.  And so on:
there is virtually no limit to the possibilities we could
envisage here, a sure sign of some deﬁciency in our
theoretical understanding of the matters under
discussion.10
Some Empirical Regularities: The
Demand for Money and Money as a
Leading Indicator
To turn to empirical evidence to provide some hints
about how these effects play out in practice is not
unlike allowing data to determine the values of “free”
parameters in an incompletely speciﬁed model. It is
no substitute for attempts to advance theoretical
understanding, but it is a useful complement, because
it can provide some stylized facts to discipline theoret-
ical conjectures.
Friedman’s (1956) suggestion that the demand for
money is an empirically stable function of a few argu-
ments was too optimistic, but there is much evidence
consistent with the view that velocity is the outcome
of the systematic portfolio choices of individual
10.  This is a deﬁciency that those monetary general equilibrium (MGE) mod-
els that focus on “limited participation” in ﬁnancial markets and on portfolio-
adjustment costs might help us to repair. Such models are well adapted to
dealing explicitly with a sequence of events in which money is injected by
way of bank loans to ﬁrms and then is paid out to households, which in turn,
take portfolio-allocation and expenditure decisions inﬂuenced by their cash
receipts. These decisions, in due course, impinge again upon banks and ﬁrms,
and so on.  See Hendry and Zhang (1998) for an example of work in this area.19 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 1999
agents, even if changes in the constraints imposed
upon those agents by the structure of the ﬁnancial
system do, from time to time, cause the demand-for-
money function to shift.11 Such evidence is neutral
between passive and active views of money. Indeed,
at ﬁrst sight, the form of equation best adapted to pin-
ning down the demand-for-money function appears
more easily reconciled with the passive view. Econo-
mists estimating that relationship have habitually
used the quantity of money actually in circulation as
their dependent variable, and (except when using
data that are highly aggregated over time, e.g., cycle-
phase or even cycle-average measures) their estimates
have usually been improved when they allowed for
the existence of signiﬁcant time lags in the response of
their dependent variable to the demand function’s
arguments by adding a lagged value of that depend-
ent variable to the right-hand side. Such relationships,
usually called short-run demand-for-money func-
tions, are obviously compatible with the behaviour of
agents who start out with a certain level of money
holdings and then adjust them slowly towards a new
equilibrium, through transactions with the banking
system, when factors affecting their demand for
money vary.12
Though a passive-money system can generate the
stylized facts captured by the typical empirical short-
run demand-for-money function, these can also occur
in an environment characterized by completely exoge-
nous nominal money. They can also arise in a world
where money is largely made up of the liability side of
the banking system’s balance sheet but in which, once
created, it stays in circulation for awhile and affects
expenditure.13 What differ among these cases are the
sources of the time lags in the relationship: with pas-
sive money, these are solely individual portfolio-
adjustment costs; with “helicopter money” they
11.  The most thorough body of empirical work on the inﬂuence of institu-
tional change on velocity is due to Michael Bordo and Lars Jonung.  See, for
example, Bordo and Jonung (1990) where references to their earlier publica-
tions on the topic can also be found.
12. The coexistence of this evidence on the demand-for-money function with
equally strong evidence that money is a leading indicator of output and
prices (to be discussed below) has sometimes caused perplexity. A 1990 Bank
of Canada conference was devoted to this question. Papers by Allan Craw-
ford (1992) and Allan Gregory, Gregor Smith, and Tony Wirjanto (1992), as
well as comments by Douglas Purvis (1992), Pierre Duguay (1992), and Peter
Howitt (1992) directly addressed the issues. The present article carries on the
discussion, largely along lines explored by Howitt.
13.   I have discussed these matters in Laidler (1990, chs. 2 and 5), where an
extensive set of references to earlier contributions can be found. See also
Davidson and Ireland (1990) and Laidler and Robson (1995).
include factors that create money-wage and price
stickiness in the economy; in the awkward intermedi-
ate case, they also involve parameters characterizing
the likelihood of excess money falling into the hands
of agents who prefer to transact with the banking sys-
tem, rather than with some other member of the non-
bank public. Empirical evidence is thus equally com-
patible with purely passive, purely active, and bidirec-
tional interpretations of the interaction between
money and the economy.
Vector-error-correction (VEC) modelling permits the
estimation of the parameters of what is usually inter-
preted as the long-run, demand-for-money function,
while explicitly maintaining a theoretically agnostic
position on the short-run adjustment processes, also
known as error-correction mechanisms, that cause actual
observations to ﬂuctuate around it. The empirical
characteristics of the latter may then be studied sepa-
rately. An appropriate dependent variable for a long-
run, demand-for-money function is the stock of real
money balances—the amount of nominal money in
circulation deﬂated by the price level. VEC modelling
permits the out-of-steady-state behaviour of real bal-
ances to be decomposed into these two components.
If nominal money is completely exogenous, then the
out-of-equilibrium dynamics of real balances, as they
return towards their steady state after a disturbance,
must be dominated by ﬂuctuations in the price level.
If nominal money is passively endogenous, those same
dynamics will be dominated by ﬂuctuations in nomi-
nal balances. In an intermediate case, the process of
adjustment will be shared between the variables.
Fluctuations in the money supply
lead those in output and prices.
Hendry (1995) has shown that this last possibility
seems to be the one that best explains Canadian data.
This result implies ﬁrst, that a fraction of non-bank
agents large enough to matter attempts to eliminate
discrepancies between desired and actual holdings of
money by transacting with other non-bank agents;
second, that these efforts affect the price level; third,
that observed changes in the quantity of real money in
circulation are, partly, the result of money playing an20 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 1999
active role in the transmission mechanism; and ﬁnally,
that there is a non-trivial, passive element in the
behaviour of nominal money. This interpretation is
consistent with a broader body of work on the indica-
tor properties of money, which has systematically
mined Canadian time-series data on various measures
of money and on such key macro variables as output
and inﬂation in a search for reliable lead-lag relation-
ships among them. It has found that ﬂuctuations in
the money supply lead those in output and prices.
Furthermore, these leading-indicator properties
remain even when account is taken of the inﬂuence of
interest rate changes on output and prices.14
Some Empirical Irregularities:
Measuring the Money Supply and
Institutional Change
When we characterize the economy we inhabit as a
market system, we apply the qualiﬁer in a way that
differs from its conventional usage in economic the-
ory. Within the theorist’s “market,” prices that create,
and then maintain, equality between the supply and
demand for all goods and services are costlessly set
and maintained, and trade takes place by a process of
continuous and frictionless multilateral barter. This
abstraction is indispensable for many purposes, but
dealing with monetary questions is not one of them.
In the real world, agents typically sell the goods and
services they supply at times and places different from
those at which they buy what they demand, and they
usually bridge the gap between the two sets of trans-
actions by accepting, holding, and in due course, pay-
ing out some commonly acceptable intermediate item.
That item is money in its means of exchange role.
Since it is convenient to have the prices of goods and
services stated in terms of the item they are usually
exchanged for, money usually serves as the economy’s
unit of account too. An item must be at least mini-
mally durable if it is to be used as a means of
exchange, and so it can also serve as a store of value.
But many items that are not means of exchange can
14.   Here I refer to work by Marcel Kasumovich (1996) who built upon Hen-
dry’s (1995) work. Fung and Kasumovich (1998) show that the active- money
interpretation of the evidence implicit here also seems to apply to data drawn
from other G–7 countries. The ﬁnding that money has leading-indicator prop-
erties even when allowance is made for the information contained in interest
rates is particularly compelling, because, as Freedman (1992, 548–49) has
argued, passive money could lead output and price-level data were agents to
adapt their holdings of money to expectations of the future response of those
variables to earlier interest rate changes.
also be so used, and the ability to serve this purpose is
not a uniquely deﬁning characteristic of money.
Serving as a means of exchange
should dominate the criteria used in
choosing what to include in an
empirical measure of money.
These considerations suggest that serving as a means
of exchange should dominate the criteria used in
choosing what to include in an empirical measure of
money. However, the very fact that some monetary
economists use the phrase transactions money to spec-
ify the real-world aggregate to which they attach pri-
mary importance warns us that this guideline is not
altogether straightforward.15 It has, in fact, become
routine to talk, not of a unique quantity of money, but
of a number of “monetary aggregates,” and to let
empirical results help decide which one is best suited
to which purpose.16 For Canada, the following gener-
alizations seem to hold. First, stable demand functions
exist for a variety of aggregates, and the rather nar-
rowly deﬁned M1 has also proved usable in studies
using VEC techniques. Second, indicators based on M1
do particularly well with respect to subsequent ﬂuctu-
ations in real variables and, at a longer horizon, pro-
vide useful information about inﬂation too. Indicators
based on broader aggregates that include assets
which, though not themselves a means of exchange,
are readily converted, seem to be more useful with
respect to inﬂation, albeit with a shorter lead time,
than those based on M1.17  Third, and crucially, all of
these relationships, including those involving M1,
15.  Like the “active/passive” terminology, the phrase “transactions money”
also seems to have its origins in Bank of Canada discussions. Note that, rather
than referring to a quantity of money held by agents for use in transactions, it
denotes a quantity supplied by the banking system that is usable in such a
way.
16.  The fullest account of the case for ultimately letting the data choose the
empirical deﬁnition of money is still that of Friedman and Schwartz (1970).
Note, however, that this approach is open to the danger of circular reasoning,
whereby the aggregate with the most stable demand function is chosen and
then used to demonstrate the stability of the demand-for-money function. See
Mason (1976).
17.  For a succinct summary of recent results on the leading-indicator aspects
of various monetary aggregates, see Atta-Mensah (1995), particularly Section 3.21 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 1999
have from time to time shifted or broken down alto-
gether for signiﬁcant periods.
Like any other, the Canadian ﬁnancial system evolves
continuously, and the nature of the assets it offers to
the public, as well as the terms on which they are
offered, also changes. For example, beginning around
1979, newly developed computer technology enabled
the chartered banks to calculate and pay daily interest
on balances held in chequable notice accounts, while
ongoing inﬂation ensured that the rate at which such
interest was paid made those accounts extremely
attractive relative to traditional non-interest-bearing
demand deposits. Demand deposits were included in
M1, but chequable notice deposits were not, and so,
inevitably, the demand function for M1 shifted as
agents moved funds from the former to the latter.18 In
the late 1990s, the demand for M1 seems to be under-
going another disturbance, this time related to the
recent phasing out of reserve requirements. These
were differentially high against demand deposits
(included in M1), giving the chartered banks an incen-
tive to work with their customers to minimize hold-
ings of them. Now, banks have begun to pay interest
on demand deposits, which were once non-interest-
bearing accounts, and business customers seem to be
shifting an increasing fraction of their liquid assets
into these accounts. Recent double-digit growth of M1
is, to a probably signiﬁcant degree, the result of these
developments.
Broad aggregates are relatively less prone to such
demand shifts, because reallocations across the mar-
gins between transactions money and other liquid
assets in response to institutional changes are hidden
within them. But these aggregates have difﬁculties of
their own. Passbook savings accounts, for example,
are readily convertible into chequable deposits, but
they are also used as savings instruments by a signiﬁ-
cant fraction of holders. They are, therefore, close sub-
stitutes for chequable notice deposits, on one margin,
and for Guaranteed Investment Certiﬁcates and Can-
ada Savings Bonds, on another.  Thus, an aggregate
that includes chequable notice deposits but excludes
passbook savings accounts draws an arbitrary line in
one place, while one that includes the latter but
18.   Small wonder that M1 growth targeting was formally given up in 1982.
On this episode, see Freedman (1983). It has subsequently become apparent
that the addition of a shift dummy variable for the years 1980–82 seems to be
enough to render the Canadian demand-for-M1 function stable, by conven-
tional standards, from the mid-1950s until the mid-1990s. See Hendry (1995)
for a recent investigation of the demand for M1 over the 1956–93 period.
excludes GICS and CSBS draws an equally arbitrary
line in another.
As the array of products that the ﬁnancial services
industry offers the public changes over time, new
problems of this sort will continue to arise.19 The
uncomfortably wide gap between simple economic
models and the sophisticated Canadian ﬁnancial sys-
tem, which provides a broad and changing array of
instruments (some of which more obviously play a
means of exchange role than others), is unlikely ever
to be bridged permanently. The best that can be done
is to monitor the effects of institutional change on the
relationship between monetary theory and the mone-
tary system to which that theory is being applied and
to adjust the application to whatever new information
this monitoring provides.
The Monetary Policy Framework
The Bank of Canada’s policy instrument is the over-
night interest rate, and the key monetary variable in
the explicit model, QPM, which provides the formal
element in the Bank’s policy framework, is not any
monetary aggregate but the yield spread between
90-day commercial paper and 10-year government
bonds. Current actions vis-à-vis the overnight rate
have to be geared to a projection of the inﬂation rate
six to eight quarters into the future, and as time
passes, policy must be adapted to changes in that pro-
jection. Thus, the structure of QPM must bridge an
uncomfortably wide gap, whether measured in terms
of steps along a causative chain or in terms of the sim-
ple passage of time, between changes in the Bank’s
instrument and its effects on the inﬂation rate. The
intellectual discomfort that this must generate could
be eased by monitoring and responding to some
observable intermediate target variable, which policy
actions affect earlier than inﬂation, but to which inﬂa-
tion’s own subsequent behaviour seems to respond
systematically.
Though the variable is not explicitly included in QPM,
money has causative signiﬁcance in the monetary pol-
icy transmission mechanism according to the “active-
money” analysis deployed earlier in this article, and
its behaviour is subject to systematic inﬂuence by the
19.   Boessenkool et al. (1997) seems to have been the ﬁrst published study to
draw attention to, and attempt to make allowances for, this recent shift in the
demand for M1. Atta-Mensah and Nott (1999) provide an extensive discussion
of recent developments in Canadian monetary aggregates in the light of insti-
tutional change. The foregoing discussion owes a great deal to conversations
with Kim McPhail and Loretta Nott.22 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 1999
central bank.20 Also, and crucially, this analysis seems
to match some key features of the Canadian economy.
The difference between the quantity in circulation of
some rather narrow transactions-oriented aggregate
and its steady-state demand—let us call it a money
gap—is the key variable here, and two considerations
weigh in favour of making it the basis of an intermedi-
ate policy target, or at least an important indicator.
First, not only does the quantity of transactions money
lie rather close to what the Bank of Canada actually
does along that causative chain known as the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy, but also, and
potentially very importantly, it helps to transmit the
effects, and hence warn of the occurrence, of impulses
that originate on the real side of the economy and
which monetary policy ought to offset.  Even though,
in Canada, transactions money is observed on only a
monthly basis and with a lag of three weeks or so, and
even though these monthly observations are
extremely “noisy,” so that only their trend over one or
two quarters can be expected to reveal information
about the appropriateness of the recent stance of pol-
icy, that is still probably early enough to prompt use-
ful action if policy appears to have strayed off track.21
Second, such use of a transactions money aggregate
would enhance the Bank of Canada’s ability to com-
municate its intentions about the future stance of pol-
icy. Inﬂation targets are now fairly credible, but the
long lag between what the Bank does to the overnight
rate now, and its ultimate effect on inﬂation, inevita-
bly leaves private agents—particularly those in ﬁnan-
cial markets—eager for further insight into what
might happen to market interest rates and the
exchange rate in the interim. Experience has shown
that for the Bank to speculate publicly about the likely
evolution of these variables, or its monetary condi-
tions index (which is a weighted average of the com-
20. QPM’s authors suggest that money’s “seemingly curious” absence is
“more apparent than real,” because, within the model,”. . . it is straightfor-
ward . . . to close the circle with respect to money growth . . . by specifying a
link between inﬂation and money growth and between the price level and the
money stock using a money-demand function . . . but nothing would be
added except an endogenous determination of monetary magnitudes. At this
level of discussion, “money is there; staff simply do not pay any explicit atten-
tion to it . . .” when they use QPM in policy exercises.  The money whose
absence from QPM is “more apparent than real,” is thus passively endog-
enous.” See Coletti, Hunt, Rose, and Tetlow (1996, 123).
21. Racette and Raynauld (1991) whose arguments are in many respects sim-
ilar to those presented here, prefer a broad monetary aggregate. Given that
broader aggregates are better leading indicators of inﬂation, there is some-
thing to be said for this position. However, the extra information that they
yield is available later than that contained in narrower measures of money,
and this reduces their usefulness as early-warning devices.
mercial paper rate and the exchange rate) even when
the risks to which such speculations are subject is
explicitly noted, invites misinterpretation.  Regular
statements from the Bank about what would consti-
tute desirable behaviour on the part of one or more
monetary aggregates over the next year, say, could be
a useful input into the attempts of private sector
agents to forecast interest rates and the exchange rate.
This would also involve less risk of the Bank appear-
ing to inadvertently tip its hand about its future inten-
tions for the interest rates under its direct control than
any statements concerned with “monetary condi-
tions.”
Certain objections to basing an intermediate policy
target on a transactions-money aggregate must, never-
theless, be taken seriously—not least that even year-
on-year variations in M1 do not betray any simple, sta-
ble correlation with year-on-year ﬂuctuations in the
price level.22 It is important to distinguish between
two factors at work here that are often confused with
one another. The ﬁrst is the occasional proclivity of M1
growth to give misleading information about output
and inﬂation. Anomalies here stem from the fact that
this particular indicator, by its very nature, makes no
allowance for the pronounced increase in the demand
for M1 that occurs at times when nominal interest
rates fall signiﬁcantly—for example as the result of a
decline in actual and expected inﬂation. There is noth-
ing surprising about this effect, and it does not under-
mine the usefulness of monetary aggregates in the
policy process.23 The second factor, the propensity of
the demand function for M1 to shift in response to
institutional change, raises more serious issues. Such
shifts are not usually predictable, and even though
they are readily observable while they are occurring, it
is sometimes hard to know when they are coming to
an end. Their occurrence suggests that it would be
unwise for the Bank of Canada to rely exclusively on a
22. Mishkin and Estrella (1998), discussing U.S. and German data, argue that
the lack of simple, stable correlations of this sort disqualiﬁes monetary aggre-
gates as useful intermediate target variables. As will be apparent from the dis-
cussion that follows, I believe that this conclusion is overstated.
23.  This effect is sometimes characterized as  the consequence of “re-entry”
from high to low inﬂation. In Canada, it was important in 1983–84, when M1
growth well into double digits was accompanied by neither an over-exuber-
ant real expansion, nor a resurgence of inﬂation, and again in the 1990s.  Its
relevance has been recognized in Canadian discussions from the late 1970s
onwards. See, for example, Freedman and Scotland (1978), and Laidler and
Robson (1991).  Its analytic basis is not a new discovery, having been dis-
cussed in the interwar literature on the Weimar Republic’s hyperinﬂation,
as Laidler and Stadler (1998)  have shown, and rigorously developed by
Phillip Cagan (1956).23 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 1999
single policy framework, based on a particular mone-
tary aggregate, to the exclusion of all else, because
there will be times when it becomes, and will be
known to have become, unreliable. But that is no argu-
ment against paying more careful attention to such a
framework than is currently the case.
It would be unwise for the Bank of
Canada to rely exclusively on a single
policy framework, based on a
particular monetary aggregate, to the
exclusion of all else . . . .
For a monetary aggregate to be a useful basis for an
intermediate target variable, it is not enough for it to
affect aggregate demand systematically: it also has to
be controllable.24 Here again, it is important not to be
misled by an at-ﬁrst-sight unpromising history. M1
growth was indeed  hard to control in the late 1970s,
but the control mechanism used at that time was
derived from analysis that embedded a short-run
demand function in a passive-money view of the
world. It was, if the arguments presented in this paper
are valid, ﬂawed in ignoring the role of credit markets
in the money-supply process.25 But that being said,
there is a surprising dearth of work exploring the
credit-market processes that link the evolution of the
money supply to variations in the interest rate varia-
ble actually under the Bank of Canada’s direct control,
and that could be used in the implemention of a
regime that uses a formal intermediate target based on
transactions money.
24.  Charleen Adam has provided helpful discussion of the role of controlla-
bility as a factor affecting the potential of a monetary aggregate to serve
as an intermediate target variable. It should also be noted that White paid
particular attention to this issue in his contribution to Courchene et al.
(1979, 601–2).
25.  For a contempory critique of the role of the passive-money view in the
money-growth-targeting regime along these lines, see Howitt and Laidler
(1979). See also footnote 4, above.
Until we have a better grasp of the complex interrela-
tionships among the overnight rate, the level and
structure of market interest rates, the volume of bank
lending, and money growth, it will be difﬁcult to
make a complete case for basing any fully ﬂedged
intermediate policy target on a monetary aggregate.
The case for treating such a variable less formally
remains. It could be a useful leading indicator of the
likely effects of past policy actions, not to mention the
effects of non-policy-induced shocks, and thus sug-
gest how the stance of policy ought to be modiﬁed.
Concluding Comments
This paper’s ﬁrst, and more general, message is that
the interaction of the supply and demand for money is
crucial, not only to the impact of monetary policy, but
also to the way in which a number of other shocks
impinge upon the economy. Instability in the demand-
for-money function does not alter the importance of
this interaction. It simply makes it more difﬁcult to
apply our understanding of it to the design of mone-
tary policy. The second message is that, when it comes
to monetary policy designed to achieve an inﬂation
goal, it would be appropriate and helpful to move
towards using one or more transactions-money aggre-
gates as the basis of an intermediate target variable.
Note, however, the phrase “move towards using.”
Currently, we do not know enough about how to con-
trol any monetary aggregate to justify its immediate
promotion to the status of a formal intermediate tar-
get. Note also the phrase “one or more transactions-
money aggregates.” There have been, and presumably
will again be, times when any particular monetary
aggregate, such as M1, will be hard to read. It would
be foolish not to keep track of a number of aggregates
in order to help out when this happens, as the Bank is
now doing with its new measures of transactions
money, M1+ and M1++ (Atta-Mensah and Nott 1999).
It would also be foolish to ignore other indicators,
such as the yield spread, that play a key role in QPM.
What is being proposed here, is the promotion of
monetary aggregates, particularly those pertaining to
transactions money, in the hierarchy of policy varia-
bles, not the displacement of other variables by them.24 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 1999
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